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Latter-day Saint Thought 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this article, I consider possible perspectives on criminal law 
linked to thought and doctrine of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints (hereinafter the “Church”). I address this topic by 
focusing on substantive criminal law, specifically on “the 
distinguishing feature” of criminal law: the institution of 
punishment.TP1 PT I examine whether the Church’s restored gospel has 
anything to say about whether we, as a secular community, are 
justified in imposing the criminal sanction and, if so, why? 
The concern for justification arises because the criminal sanction 
entails the purposeful infliction of suffering upon offenders TP2 PT and thus 
on its face appears at odds with the demands of ordinary morality to 
do our all to relieve suffering. Justificatory theories are generally 
categorized as utilitarian, retributive, or a mixture of the two.TP3 PT I hope 
to show that Latter-day Saint doctrine relating to agency and the 
premortal existence supports, and is very much consistent with, some 
varieties of retributive theories of punishment. In this sense, I 
suggest that Church doctrine provides a unique foundation for the 
view that punishment is required in order that justice be done. TP4 PT 
 
T∗T Steinhart Foundation Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. The author expresses gratitude 
to Justin Walker, a third-year law student at the University of Nebraska College of Law, for his research 
assistance. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, the J. Reuben Clark Law School, or the Brigham Young University Law 
Review. 
 T1T. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 25 (1998). 
 T2T. H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 4–5 (1968). 
 T3T. See Michael S. Moore, A Taxonomy of Purposes of Punishment, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 60, 62–63 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999). 
 T4T. Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, more commonly 
known as the Mormons, (hereinafter “Latter-day Saints”) can, of course, join others in also 
defending, where viable, utilitarian justifications of punishment. Moreover, the argument 
presented in this article is not directed to any particular actors within the Latter-day Saint legal 
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I proceed in Part II by sketching a retributive theory of 
punishment developed by several prominent legal philosophers. Part 
III considers the few statements regarding criminal punishment 
espoused by Latter-day Saint scriptures and Latter-day Saint church 
leaders. Part III.C then examines the principles of agency within the 
context of the restored gospel, suggesting that these principles 
supply a doctrinal basis for a Latter-day Saint justification of the 
criminal sanction. In Part IV, I consider capital punishment in light 
of the ideas expressed in Parts II and III and argue that my proposed 
Latter-day Saint perspective on punishment in general does not 
necessarily commit Church members to advocate the death penalty 
as a particular form of punishment. 
II. “JUST DESERTS” RETRIBUTIVISM 
While a number of retributive theories exist,5 I would like to 
focus on the variety that regards the punishment of culpable violators 
of criminal rules as a demand of justice. Under this view, punishment 
is justified, indeed required, simply because it is just. In contrast to 
utilitarian theories that justify punishment as effectuating such 
beneficial consequences as deterring crime or incapacitating crime-
prone offenders, just deserts theory considers punishing offenders as 
intrinsically good, independent of any beneficial consequences. 
Indeed, some desert theorists might advocate punishing offenders 
even if the results of such were socially detrimental. 
community, some of whom may be obligated under other Church doctrine to obey positive 
legal rules that might not be fully consistent with the theory presented here. See Articles of 
Faith 12 (Pearl of Great Price) (“We believe in being subject to kings, presidents, rulers, and 
magistrates, in obeying, honoring and sustaining the law.”); see also infra notes 29–30. The 
theory of punishment presented herein is thus offered as an ideal, to be maintained when 
found in practice within existing legal systems and to be sought for through lawful means 
within systems where it is not found. 
In arguing that Latter-day Saint doctrine provides a “unique foundation” for retributive 
theory, I do not mean to suggest that these doctrinal positions must necessarily be embraced 
by retributivists. The claim here is simply that the strong sense of agency and accountability 
found in Latter-day Saint thought offers a powerful grounding for retributive theory. 
 5. For example, sometimes retributive theories claim that doing justice is merely a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for punishing. See, e.g., K.G. Armstrong, The 
Retributivist Hits Back, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 138 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969). 
Other theories, such as those described in the text accompanying infra notes 6–18, claim that 
doing justice is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for punishing. 
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Contemporary just deserts theory echoes the classic retributive 
views of Immanuel Kant. The following provides a summary of 
Kant’s views: 
 Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to 
promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil 
society, but instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on 
the ground that he has committed a crime; for a human being can 
never be manipulated merely as a means to the purposes of 
someone else . . . . His innate personality [that is, his right as a 
person] protects him against such treatment. . . . The law 
concerning punishment is a categorical imperative, and woe to him 
who rummages around in the winding paths of a theory of 
happiness looking for some advantage to be gained by releasing the 
criminal from punishment or by reducing the amount of it—in 
keeping with the Pharisaic motto: “It is better that one man should 
die than that the whole people should perish.” If legal justice 
perishes, then it is no longer worthwhile for men to remain alive on 
this earth.6
Kant goes on to posit a principle for assessing the degree of 
deserved punishment: the principle of equality, the Mosaic lex 
talonis. Kant explains that “any undeserved evil . . . you inflict on 
[another] you do to yourself. If you vilify him, you vilify yourself; if 
you steal from him, you steal from yourself; if you kill him, you kill 
yourself.”7 In the context of the death penalty, Kant offers the 
following famous observation: 
There is no sameness of kind between death and remaining alive 
even under the most miserable conditions, and consequently there 
is also no equality between the crime and the retribution unless the 
criminal is judicially condemned and put to death. . . . Even if a 
civil society were to dissolve itself by common agreement of all its 
members (for example, if the people inhabiting an island decided to 
 6. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John Lodd 
trans., 1965). Kant illustrates the primacy of the value of justice: 
[W]hat should one think of the proposal to permit a criminal who has been 
condemned to death to remain alive, if, after consenting to allow dangerous 
experiments to be made on him, he happily survives such experiments and if doctors 
thereby obtain new information that benefits the community? Any court of justice 
would repudiate such a proposal with scorn if it were suggested by a medical 
college, for [legal] justice ceases to be justice if it can be bought for a price. 
Id. at 100–01. 
 7. Id. at 101. 
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separate and disperse themselves around the world), the last 
murderer remaining in prison must first be executed, so that 
everyone will duly receive what his actions are worth and so that 
the bloodguilt thereof will not be fixed on the people because they 
failed to insist on carrying out the punishment; for if they fail to do 
so, they may be regarded as accomplices in this public violation of 
legal justice.8
Some observations are in order. For Kant, one’s “innate 
personality, his right as a person,” protects him from being used as a 
means for the benefit of others. His human dignity entitles him to be 
dealt with as an end in himself, as a free moral agent. Unless he 
deserves punishment, he cannot be punished, even if doing so would 
result in huge social benefits. But if he is deserving of punishment, 
he must be punished. Justice demands as much. 
Indirectly, Kant argues that persons have a right to be punished. 
Such a position is made explicit in the writings of Herbert Morris. In 
his paper, Persons and Punishment,9 Professor Morris argues that 
guilty persons have a moral right to be punished for their criminal 
offenses. Under Morris’s theory, the moral right to be punished 
derives from a more fundamental natural right that is inalienable and 
absolute: the right to be treated as a person. Persons are entitled to 
have their choices respected. Therefore, when one chooses to engage 
in morally reprehensible conduct prohibited by a just system of 
criminal law,10 one chooses also the consequences of his offense: 
punishment.11
 8. Id. at 102. 
 9. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT 74 (Joel Feinberg & 
Hyman Gross eds., 1975). The description in the text of Morris’s theory is drawn from my 
previous works. See Martin R. Gardner, The Right to be Punished—A Suggested Constitutional 
Theory, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 838, 839–46 (1981) (reprinted with permission of the RUTGERS 
LAW REVIEW); Martin R. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders to be Punished: Some 
Implications of Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. REV. 182, 183–87 (1989). 
 10. Professor Morris’s “right to be punished” theory is applicable only within a legal 
system that conditions punishment on a careful finding that a person is guilty of violating a 
“primary rule,” which is similar to a core rule of our criminal law. To avoid unjust applications 
of punishment, accused offenders must be afforded a variety of substantive defenses, permitting 
them to show that their offenses were involuntary or otherwise excusable. Moreover, the 
system must provide safeguards against double jeopardy and self-incrimination, rights to trial 
by jury, requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a prerequisite to conviction, and 
protections against punishment that is disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense or the 
culpability of the offender. Morris, supra note 9, at 75–78. 
 11. Professor Morris justifies the institution of punishment as both a necessary means of 
promoting compliance with the law and as a requirement of justice. Id. at 75–80. Justice 
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At first blush, one may wonder how being subjected to 
punishment could ever be meaningfully viewed as a “right” rather 
than an onus of the severest sort. If “rights” are claims that must be 
honored upon assertion, why would anyone in possession of his or 
her senses ever demand to be punished? The answer becomes clear if 
we imagine a world without criminal law, where the void created by 
the criminal sanction is filled by a therapeutic response to anti-social 
behavior.12
Non-punitive sanctions, imposing compulsory therapy or 
rehabilitation, regard deviant behavior as merely symptomatic of 
pathological conditions or emotional immaturity rather than as the 
actions of responsible human agents. Thus, therapy and 
rehabilitation are directed toward altering the offender’s currently 
undesirable conditions with no necessary attention paid to past 
undesirable conduct. In this way, coerced therapeutic responses fail 
to respect the rational choices, and thus the personhood, of the 
offender. Moreover, therapy tends toward paternalism and coercion 
insofar as the therapist is assumed to know, and thus often permitted 
to use, those treatments that will be beneficial, no matter how 
objectionable the “patient” may find them. On the other hand, the 
primary thrust of punishment, rather than seeking to benefit the 
offender, is to exact from the recipient the amount of suffering 
deemed proper to pay the “debt” owed society through commission 
of the offense. Payment of the debt nullifies the offender’s guilt.
As a theory of justice, the right to be punished embraces the 
traditional retributive requirements that the form and degree of 
punishment be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense, as 
determined by the characteristic harmfulness of the conduct and the 
individual culpability of the offender.13 Moreover, forms of 
punishment that fail to respect the dignity of the person are, of 
course, impermissible. Persons are subject only to just and humane 
demands that an offender be punished in order to restore the equilibrium lost through the 
offender’s renunciation of the burdens of law-abiding conduct. Without punishment, the 
offender would gain an unfair advantage over law-abiding citizens since he would receive the 
benefits of life within the legal order, without assuming the burdens of restraining his conduct 
in accordance with the rules of the legal system. Id. 
 12. C.S. Lewis notes that therapeutic alternatives to the criminal law would inevitably 
become coercive: “If a tendency to steal can be cured by psychotherapy, the thief will no doubt 
be forced to undergo the treatment.” C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 
RES JUDICATAE 224, 224 (1953). 
 13. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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punishment and have rights to be free from unjust, cruel, or 
inhumane punishments. 
Similar to Morris, C.S. Lewis also appears to embrace a right to 
be punished. Lewis has sarcastically labeled the substitution of a 
therapeutic response for sanctions meting out just deserts the 
“Humanitarian Theory,”14 which he criticizes as follows: 
We demand of a cure not whether it is just but whether it succeeds. 
Thus, when we cease to consider what the criminal deserves and 
consider only what will cure him . . . , we have tacitly removed him 
from the sphere of justice altogether; instead of a person, a subject 
of rights, we now have a mere object, a patient, a “case.”15
 14. See supra note 12. 
 15. Lewis, supra note 12, at 225. Lewis also objects to grounding punishment theory 
on deterrence principles: 
  If we turn from the curative to the deterrent justification of punishment we 
shall find the new theory even more alarming. When you punish a man in terrorem, 
make of him an “example” to others, you are admittedly using him as a means to an 
end; someone else’s end. This, in itself, would be a very wicked thing to do. On the 
classical theory of Punishment it was of course justified on the ground that the man 
deserved it. That was assumed to be established before any question of “making him 
an example” arose. You then, as the saying is, killed two birds with one stone; in the 
process of giving him what he deserved you set an example to others. But take away 
desert and the whole morality of the punishment disappears. Why, in Heaven’s 
name, am I to be sacrificed to the good of society in this way?—unless, of course, I 
deserve it. 
  But that is not the worst. If the justification of exemplary punishment is not be 
to based on desert but solely on its efficacy as a deterrent, it is not absolutely 
necessary that the man we punish should even have committed the crime. The 
deterrent effect demands that the public should draw the moral, “If we do such an 
act we shall suffer like that man.” The punishment of a man actually guilty whom 
the public think innocent will not have the desired effect; the punishment of a man 
actually innocent will, provided the public think him guilty. But every modern State 
has powers which make it easy to fake a trial. When a victim is urgently needed for 
exemplary purposes and a guilty victim cannot be found, all the purposes of 
deterrence will be equally served by the punishment (call it “cure” if you prefer) of 
an innocent victim, provided that the public can be cheated into thinking him 
guilty. It is no use to ask me why I assume that our rulers will be so wicked. The 
punishment of an innocent, that is, an undeserving, man is wicked only if we grant 
the traditional view that righteous punishment means deserved punishment. Once 
we have abandoned that criterion, all punishments have to be justified, if at all, on 
other grounds that have nothing to do with desert. Where the punishment of the 
innocent can be justified on those grounds (and it could in some cases be justified as 
a deterrent) it will be no less moral than any other punishment. Any distaste for it 
on the part of a Humanitarian will be merely a hang-over from the Retributive 
theory. 
Id. at 227–28. 
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Lewis adds this observation: 
Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its 
victims may be the most oppressive. . . . To be “cured” against 
one’s will and cured of states which we may not regard as disease is 
to be put on a level with those who have not yet reached the age of 
reason or those who never will; to be classed with infants, 
imbeciles, and domestic animals. But to be punished, however 
severely, because we have deserved it, because we “ought to have 
known better,” is to be treated as a human person made in God’s 
image.16
Responding to possible criticisms that giving offenders their just 
deserts may be unduly legalistic and void of proper compassion, 
Lewis points out: 
I think it [is] essential to oppose the Humanitarian theory . . . root 
and branch, wherever we encounter it. It carries on its front a 
semblance of mercy which is wholly false. That is how it can 
deceive men of good will. . . . [T]he distinction [between justice 
and mercy] . . . is essential. The older view was that mercy 
“tempered” justice, or (on the highest level of all) that mercy and 
justice had met and kissed. The essential act of mercy was to 
pardon; and pardon in its very essence involves the recognition of 
guilt and ill-desert in the recipient. . . . But the Humanitarian 
theory wants simply to abolish Justice and substitute Mercy for it. 
This means that you start being “kind” to people before you have 
considered their rights, and then force upon them supposed 
kindnesses which they in fact had a right to refuse, and finally 
kindnesses which no one but you will recognize as kindnesses and 
which the recipient will feel as abominable cruelties. You have 
overshot the mark. Mercy, detached from Justice, grows 
unmerciful. That is the important paradox. As there are plants 
which will flourish only in mountain soil, so it appears that Mercy 
will flower only when it grows in the crannies of the rock of Justice: 
transplanted to the marshlands of mere Humanitarianism, it 
becomes a man-eating weed, all the more dangerous because it is 
still called by the same name as the mountain variety.17
 16. Id. at 228. 
 17. Id. at 229–30. For a criticism of Lewis’s views, see Norval Morris & Donald Buckle, 
The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment: A Reply to C.S. Lewis, 6 RES JUDICATAE 231 (1953). 
For Lewis’s reply to the reply, see C. S. Lewis, On Punishment: A Reply, 6 RES JUDICATAE 519 
(1954). 
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Like Morris and Lewis, Herbert Packer suggests that abandoning 
the criminal sanction in favor of therapeutic responses would result 
in the loss of important rights.18 Packer asks us to consider a world 
without punishment by engaging in the following thought 
experiment:19 Suppose scientists develop a “good behavior pill” that 
permanently alters human personality by removing all criminal 
propensities without generating any unfortunate side effects. 
Suppose further that the state responds to this development by 
abandoning the use of punishment in lieu of compelling those who 
engage in anti-social conduct (or even those who do not) to take a 
“good-behavior pill.”20 Packer asks whether such a response might 
be objectionable as a violation of one’s “right to be bad” and thus at 
odds “with long standing ideals of human autonomy.”21
The views of a final retributivist, Michael Moore, are worthy of 
note. Unlike thinkers in the Kantian tradition who ground their 
theories in principles of justice, Moore considers what our emotions 
teach us about punishment. In Moore’s words: 
Our concern for retributive justice might be motivated by very 
deep emotions that are nonetheless of a wholly virtuous nature. 
These are the feelings of guilt we would have if we did the kinds of 
acts that fill the criminal appellate reports of any state. 
 The psychiatrist Willard Gaylin interviewed a number of people 
closely connected to the brutal hammering death of Bonnie 
Garland by her jilted boyfriend, Richard Herrin. He asked a 
number of those in a Christian order that had been particularly 
forgiving of Richard whether they could imagine themselves 
performing such an act under any set of circumstances. Their 
answer was uniformly “Yes.” All of us can at least find it 
conceivable that there might be circumstances under which we 
could perform an act like Herrin’s—not exactly the same, perhaps, 
but something pretty horrible. . . . 
 18. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 53–57 (1968). 
 19. Id. at 56–57. 
 20. Id. at 57. 
 21. Id. at 57–88. Is this another way of describing the right to be treated as a person 
that is similar to the views of Kant, Morris, and Lewis? It must be noted, however, that unlike 
Kant, Morris, and Lewis, Packer adopts a mixed theory of punishment embracing both 
retributive and utilitarian aspects. For Packer, the culpability of the offender acts only as a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for punishment. Culpability is thus a limiting principle 
that assures that only those deserving of punishment receive it. See id. at 62–70. 
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 Then ask yourself: What would you feel like if it was you who 
had intentionally smashed open the skull of a 23 year-old woman 
with a claw hammer while she was asleep, a woman whose fatal 
defect was a desire to free herself from your too clinging embrace? 
My own response, I hope, would be that I would feel guilty unto 
death. I couldn’t imagine any suffering that could be imposed 
upon me that would be unfair because it exceeded what I deserved. 
 Is that virtuous? Such deep feelings of guilt seem to me to be 
the only tolerable response of a moral being. “Virtue” is perhaps an 
odd word in the context of extreme culpability, but such guilt 
seems, at the least, very appropriate. One ought to feel so guilty 
one wants to die. Such sickness unto death is to my mind more 
virtuous than the nonguilty state to which Richard Herrin brought 
himself, with some help from Christian counseling about the need 
for self-forgiveness. After three years in prison on an eight- to 
twenty-five-year sentence for “heat of passion” manslaughter, 
Richard thought he had suffered quite enough for the killing of 
Bonnie.22
Although Herrin admitted that he had dealt with his victim unfairly, 
he criticized his sentencing judge for not allowing him a chance to 
live a “productive life” in society and complained that he was being 
required to unfairly waste his life in prison.23
In response to Herrin’s self-serving attitude, Moore observes: 
“Compared to such shallow, easily obtained self-absolution for a 
horrible violation of another, a deep sense of guilt looks very 
virtuous indeed. . . . The alternative, of not crying over spilt milk (or 
blood), is truly indecent. A moral being feels guilty when he or she is 
guilty of past wrongs.”24
Moore goes on: 
We should trust what our imagined guilt feelings tell us; for acts 
like those of Richard Herrin, that if we did them we would be so 
guilty that some extraordinarily severe punishment would be 
deserved. We should trust the judgments such imagined guilt 
feelings spawn . . . . [S]uch guilt feelings typically engender the 
 22. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL 
LAW, supra note 3, at 80–81. 
 23. Id. at 81–82. 
 24. Id. at 82. 
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judgment that we deserve punishment. . . . that we ought to be 
punished. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . [W]e should ask whether there is any reason not to make 
the same judgment about Richard Herrin’s actual deserts as we are 
willing to make about our own hypothetical deserts. If we 
experience any reluctance to transfer the guilt and desert we would 
possess, had we done what Richard Herrin did, to Herrin himself, 
we should examine that reluctance carefully. Doesn’t it come from 
feeling more of a person than Richard? . . . [W]e certainly have 
never been subject to the exact same stresses and motivations as 
Richard Herrin. Therefore, it may be tempting to withhold from 
Richard the benefit each of us gives himself or herself: the benefit 
of being the subjective seat of a will that, although caused, is 
nonetheless capable of both choice and responsibility. 
 Such discrimination is a temptation to be resisted, because it is 
no virtue. It is elitist and condescending toward others not to grant 
them the same responsibility and desert you grant yourself. 
Admittedly, there are excuses the benefit of which others as well as 
yourself may avail themselves. . . . Herrin had no excuse the rest of 
us could not come up with in terms of various causes for our 
choices. To refuse to grant him the same responsibility and desert 
as you would grant yourself is thus an instance of . . . treating a 
free, subjective will as an object. It is a refusal to admit that the rest 
of humanity shares with us that which makes us most distinctively 
human, our capacity to will and reason—and thus to be and do 
evil. Far from evincing fellow feeling and the allowing of others to 
participate in our moral life, it excludes them as less than persons.25
Most of the views of these retributive thinkers are attractive to 
me as an academic criminal lawyer. They also resonate with me as a 
Latter-day Saint. The remainder of this paper will attempt to explain 
why such views might be particularly well-fitting in the Latter-day 
Saint tradition. 
 25. Id. at 82–83. 
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III. SECULAR PUNISHMENT AND LATTER-DAY SAINT THOUGHT 
A. Scriptural References 
Latter-day Saint scripture, with its attention to the Savior’s 
Atonement, has much to say about the subject of punishment, 
justice, and mercy in the eternal context. On the other hand, 
modern revelation, not surprisingly, provides few explicit references 
in the standard works to the criminal sanction in secular legal 
systems. That the scriptures say anything about the subject, 
particularly in admonishing use of the criminal sanction, is perhaps 
significant given biblical cautions about going “to law with 
another”26 in the context of civil, and perhaps even criminal, 
matters.27
Yet Doctrine & Covenants section 134 clearly discusses the 
criminal justice system: 
 We believe that the commission of crime should be punished 
according to the nature of the offense; that murder, treason, 
robbery, theft, and the breach of the general peace, in all respects, 
should be punished according to their criminality and their 
tendency to evil among men, by the laws of that government in 
which the offense is committed; and for the public peace and 
tranquility all men should step forward and use their ability in 
bringing offenders against good laws to punishment.28
While the last clause of this text suggests utilitarian purposes of 
punishment (offenders should be punished “for the public peace and 
tranquility”), the first clause (perhaps describing the primary purpose 
of punishment) expresses just deserts principles.29 Criminals are to be 
punished “according to the nature of their offense . . . and according 
to their criminality.” Thus, punishment should correspond to the 
 26. 1 Corinthians 6:1–7. 
 27. See DALLIN H. OAKS, THE LORD’S WAY 162 (1991). 
 28. Doctrine & Covenants 134:8. 
 29. In an earlier verse, section 134 addresses a commitment to uphold the legal order 
“for the good and safety of society”: “We believe that governments were instituted of God for 
the benefit of man; and that he holds men accountable for their acts in relation to them, both 
in making laws and administering them, for the good and safety of society.” Doctrine & 
Covenants 134:1. Such utilitarian views of the virtues of law in general do not necessarily 
contradict a reading of verse 8 as espousing a just deserts theory. Indeed, unless the criminal 
law principles reflected in verse 8 are understood to embrace justice principles not articulated 
in the utilitarianism of verse 1, verse 8 appears to add little and is thus, perhaps, redundant. 
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nature of the offense. An offender’s “criminality” and “tendency to 
evil” must also be taken into account. While the text speaks of 
“criminality” in the context of offenses, perhaps this term might be 
better understood to speak to the blameworthiness of the offender, 
since the concern for proportioning punishment to the seriousness of 
the offense is already made clear by the language specifying “nature 
of the offense” and its “tendency to evil.” If the scripture teaches 
that offenders are to be punished commensurate to their personal 
culpability30 and the harm caused by their actions, the verse expresses 
the exact factors articulated by Andrew von Hirsch in fashioning his 
neo-Kantian theory of commensurate deserts.31
While Doctrine & Covenants section 134 admonishes “all men” 
to bring offenders to punishment, section 42 of the Doctrine & 
Covenants specifically directs members of the Church to participate 
in the workings of the criminal justice system, even to the point of 
“delivering up” fellow members who commit crime: 
 And it shall come to pass, that if any persons among you shall 
kill they shall be delivered up and dealt with according to the laws 
of the land; . . . and it shall be proved according to the laws of the 
land. . . . And if a man or woman shall rob, he or she shall be 
delivered up unto the law of the land. And if he or she shall steal, 
he or she shall be delivered up unto the law of the land. And if he 
 30. That personal culpability is an imperative is further suggested by other language in 
section 134: “We believe that every man should be honored in his station, rulers and 
magistrates as such, being placed for the protection of the innocent and the punishment of the 
guilty . . . .” Doctrine & Covenants 134:6. The reference to “punishment,” the distinguishing 
feature of the criminal law, see FLETCHER, supra note 1, at 25, in the quoted language thus 
appears to address criminal law matters. “Rulers and magistrates” (perhaps judges?) are to 
protect the “innocent.” The most obvious way in which judges protect the innocent in the 
criminal law context is by assuring that punishment not be imposed on non-culpable 
defendants. Verse 1 thus appears to express the mandate that punishment should be imposed 
but only on culpable offenders. 
While the first clause of verse 1 thus appears to express principles of just deserts, 
subsequent language, as in verse 1, see supra note 29, addresses the virtues of the legal order in 
general in utilitarian terms. “[T]o the laws all men owe respect and deference, as without them 
peace and harmony would be supplanted by anarchy and terror; human laws being instituted 
for the express purpose of regulating our interests as individuals and nations, between man and 
man . . . .” Doctrine & Covenants 134:6. Therefore, on this interpretation, Doctrine & 
Covenants section 134 verses 1, 6, and 8 commit Latter-day Saints to embrace the legal order 
in general because of the benefits derived from life under law. On the other hand, when it 
comes to the criminal law in particular, its primary function appears to be the dispensation of 
justice: punishing the guilty and assuring that the non-guilty not be punished. 
 31. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 66, 79–
80 (1976). 
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or she shall lie, he or she shall be delivered up unto the law of the 
land.32
The modern scriptures do not explain why it is a matter of 
religious obligation to see that offenders be punished by secular law. 
Of course, one explanation might simply be that doing so will result 
in less crime and thus a better society. Such a utilitarian view does 
not uniquely belong to the Latter-day Saints. However, if the 
scriptural language, “persons among you,” refers to Church 
members, section 42 spells out an obligation to see that civil 
 32. Doctrine & Covenants 42:79, 42:84–86. The Doctrine & Covenants is not the sole 
Latter-day Saint scripture that discusses secular punishment. The Book of Mormon notes in 
several places that a system of criminal law and punishment was in place in ancient America. As 
I have argued elsewhere, some Book of Mormon scriptures that appear to speak of secular 
punishment are better understood as discussing eternal punishment, while other scriptures that 
do address secular punishment do so merely to point out facts about Book of Mormon society 
rather than to impose obligations to punish: 
  Turning finally to the Book of Mormon, one finds a variety of passages that 
may seem to suggest that murderers should suffer the death penalty. Second Nephi 
9:35 provides, “Wo unto the murderer who deliberately killeth, for he shall die.” 
But when this verse is read in the context of the rest of the chapter, it becomes clear 
that . . . spiritual, and not physical death is being discussed. [Two examples are] 2 
Nephi 9:28, 38–39 [and] . . . 2 Nephi 26:32 . . . . Man “perishes,” suffers spiritual 
death, when he murders or commits other sins. 
  Other verses in the Book of Mormon seem to recognize capital [and other] 
punishment as a reality of ancient society. Alma 1:18 provides: “And they durst not 
steal for fear of the law, for such were punished; neither durst they rob, nor murder, 
for he that murdered was punished unto death.” [The verses clearly express an 
appeal to general deterrence as the basis for punishments. As such, there appears no 
reason to see the penalties as necessary, as ends in themselves, to do God’s will. 
Rather, the punishments seem to have been employed contingently as means to 
deter.] . . . 
  Other scriptures in the Book of Mormon indicate that personal atonement 
through capital punishment of murderers may be inconsistent with Christ’s 
atonement. [See] Alma 34:10–12. . . . The scripture recognizes the reality of capital 
punishment for murder in ancient society but says nothing about capital punishment 
being required by either God or by principles of justice. The reference to “just law” 
seems to refer to the well-recognized principle of justice forbidding criminal 
punishment of those who obey the law. Justice demands that only the culpable be 
punished. The scripture thus does not say that justice requires capital punishment, 
but that any punishment be a consequence of personal blameworthiness. 
Martin R. Gardner, Mormonism and Capital Punishment: A Doctrinal Perspective Past and 
Present, DIALOGUE: A JOURNAL OF MORMON THOUGHT, Spring 1979, at 21–22. 
For a similar argument that Doctrine & Covenants 42:19, “he that killeth shall die,” 
refers to spiritual rather than physical death, see id. at 42:20–21. This interpretation is also 
embraced by Dallin H. Oaks, supra note 27, at 213. Note, however, that Bruce R. McConkie 
disagrees and sees capital punishment as divinely required by section 42 verse 19. See Gardner, 
supra, at 18. 
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punishment is imposed on persons who are also subject to 
ecclesiastical sanction which, for such persons, might be as effective 
as civil punishment in deterring the described acts. Perhaps, 
therefore, the obligation to see that violators of criminal law are 
punished is not grounded in utilitarian theory but reflects the 
retributive interest in seeing that justice is done through application 
of punitive sanctions not available to Church tribunals. On this view, 
it is essential that violators of the law be punished in order to receive 
their just deserts. 
B. Views of Church Leaders 
Interpretations of sections 134 and 42 as grounded in retributive 
theory appear consistent with the few expressions of Church leaders 
regarding the function of the criminal sanction. In words reminiscent 
of Kant’s urgings that the last offender on an island be punished, 
even if the island society were to disband by mutual consent,33 
Brigham Young is said to have made the following statement in 
urging the 1846 Municipal High Council34 to bring to justice 
members of the Church who had “trampled on the rights of the 
Priesthood . . . [I am] not so much afraid of going into the 
wilderness alone but [that] offenders go unpunished for such or like 
offenses.”35
Assuming that Young’s words were not the product of a spirit of 
vengeance, a motive inconsistent with Latter-day Saint teachings,36 
his views might be expressions of a desire that offenders be given 
their just deserts. As with Kant’s example of punishing the last 
offender on the soon-to-be abandoned island society, Young’s desire 
that offending Church members receive civil punishment (corporal 
punishment, fines, restitution, and community service were 
apparently the penalties of the day)37 as well as ecclesiastical sanction 
 33. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 34. The Municipal High Council was a court exercising both civil and ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction in fraud and theft cases during the Nauvoo exodus. See EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE 
& RICHARD COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS 288, 355, 360–61 (1988). 
 35. Quoted in id. at 361. 
 36. Spencer W. Kimball taught that “[t]he spirit of revenge, of retaliation, of bearing a 
grudge, is entirely foreign to the gospel of . . . Jesus Christ.” SPENCER W. KIMBALL, THE 
MIRACLE OF FORGIVENESS 265 (1969). Dallin H. Oaks adds: “Revenge is never a proper 
motive for a Christian.” OAKS, supra note 27, at 181. 
 37. See FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 34, at 361. 
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appears grounded in retributive rather than utilitarian principles. 
Arguably, subjecting offending Church members to ecclesiastical 
sanction, excommunication in particular, would have provided a 
significant general deterrent effect regarding other members tempted 
to commit similar crimes. Moreover, specific deterrence concerns 
would seemingly not require criminal punishment. If a given 
offender did not learn his lesson by being excommunicated, he could 
simply be left behind by the Latter-day Saint community as it moved 
west. 
Utilitarian concerns for incapacitating dangerous offenders 
appear equally inapposite given the forms of civil punishment 
employed.38 Young’s demand for civil punishment thus appears best 
explicable as a Kantian categorical imperative. Offenders, even in 
situations where society may disband and leave them behind, must 
be punished in order for justice to be done. 
Neal A. Maxwell, seemingly joining C.S. Lewis’s opposition to 
the “Humanitarian Theory,” recently observed that society often 
overlooks the importance of justice. Maxwell observes: 
 Now, you are going to live out your lives in contemporary 
society. It is a society in which, instead of a rush to judgment, there 
is almost a rush to mercy, because people are so anxious to be 
nonjudgmental. Many have quite a confused understanding of 
mercy and justice. People tend to shy away from correction even 
when it might be helpful.39
Maxwell then quotes Lewis’s view that “[m]ercy detached from 
Justice grows unmerciful.”40 Assuming that Maxwell is including the 
criminal justice system in his remarks, the caution against a “rush to 
mercy” appears to place a very high value on holding offenders 
accountable for their actions. While it is surely true that in other 
contexts the “merciful are blest,”41 apparently so far as the criminal 
 38. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 39. Neal A. Maxwell, Jesus, the Perfect Mentor, ENSIGN, Feb. 2001, at 8, 12. 
 40. Id.; see supra note 17 and accompanying text. For information on the Church’s 
belief on justice and mercy, see the following: Bruce C. Hafen, Justice and Mercy, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM 775–76 (Daniel H. Ludlow ed., 1995); Bruce C. Hafen, 
Justice, Mercy, and Rehabilitation, in THE BROKEN HEART 143–54 (1989); JOHN TAYLOR, 
MEDIATION AND ATONEMENT OF OUR LORD AND SAVIOR JESUS CHRIST (1882); 2 Nephi 
9:25, 25:23 (Book of Mormon); Mosiah 3:11 (Book of Mormon); Alma 41:2–6 (Book of 
Mormon); Alma 42 (Book of Mormon); 3 Nephi 27:14–16 (Book of Mormon); Doctrine & 
Covenants 82:10; and Articles of Faith 2 (Pearl of Great Price). 
 41. Matthew 5:7 (King James). 
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justice system is concerned, doing justice is the higher virtue. If I am 
interpreting Maxwell’s views correctly, it would appear that he would 
also subscribe to Lewis’s view that “to be punished, however 
severely, because we have deserved it, because we ‘ought to have 
known better,’ is to be treated as a human person made in God’s 
image.”42 Likewise, it would appear that abandoning the criminal 
sanction for Herbert Packer’s “good behavior pill”43 would be an 
undesirable manifestation of the “rush to mercy” because it would 
render justice irrelevant by removing the possibilities of agency and, 
hence, accountability. 
Although Maxwell does not specifically refer to the criminal 
justice system when counseling against a rush to mercy, Dallin H. 
Oaks clearly recognizes the significance of retributive theory in 
secular law by observing that “[t]he paramount concern of human 
[criminal] law is justice.”44 He adds: 
[T]he laws of man focus on justice, [and] have no theory of 
mercy. . . . When the criminal law has been violated, justice usually 
requires that a punishment be imposed. . . . People generally feel 
that justice has been done when an offender receives what he 
deserves—when the punishment fits the crime. Thus our church’s 
declaration of belief states that “the commission of crime should be 
punished.”45
 42. See supra text accompanying note 16. Viewing Maxwell’s teachings as embracing the 
just deserts theory may appear at odds with his observation that “[p]eople tend to shy away 
from correction even when it might be helpful.” Maxwell, supra note 39, at 12 (emphasis 
added). While such language might appear to embrace a utilitarian theory of punishment, it 
can perhaps better be read to mean that correction (punishment?) might sometimes be 
“helpful” in addition to its other virtues. Thus, the thrust of Maxwell’s comments appear to 
me to suggest that punishment (doing justice) is desirable whether or not it results in beneficial 
consequences. 
 43. See supra text accompanying notes 19–20. 
 44. OAKS, supra note 27, at 217. Oaks also notes, “preserv[ing] peace and harmony by 
encouraging injured parties to forego private retribution or revenge and look to the laws and 
civil authorities to punish their adversary . . . or to deter or prevent future wrongs” as purposes 
for criminal punishment, both of which are utilitarian interests. Id. at 211. If, for Oaks, the 
paramount concern of the criminal law is to do justice, these utilitarian interests would appear 
subsidiary. 
 45. Id. at 216–17. Oaks contrasts earthly criminal law, with its emphasis on justice with 
“church discipline” the primary goal of which is to “save souls” accomplished through justice 
but more particularly through “mercy and the atonement.” Id. While the “laws of man focus 
on justice” with little attention to the divine virtue of mercy, Oaks is clear in his view that 
however inferior to divine law, “our church’s declaration of belief states that ‘the commission 
of crime should be punished [through the secular criminal law].’” Id. 
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Oaks thus describes the scriptural admonition that “crime should 
be punished” as fundamentally grounded in the interest of doing 
justice. Moreover, Oaks’s reference to the “feelings” of people as an 
indicium of justice may be a nod in the direction of recognizing 
virtuous emotions as the philosophical ground for generating a just 
deserts theory along the lines of the one by Michael Moore outlined 
above.46
C. Agency and the Premortal Life 
If some Church leaders are in favor of a just deserts theory of 
criminal punishment, the underlying rationale for such a view is not 
made explicit. However, Joseph Smith’s teachings about the concept 
of agency, in the context of premortal life, appear to be a fertile 
source of support for some Church leaders’ affinity to a just deserts 
model. 
In a widely embraced interpretation47 of certain scriptural 
references as amplified by Joseph Smith’s King Follett Discourse, 
Moreover, Oaks also contrasts this secular criminal punishment with eternal punishment, 
noting that the primary purpose of both is the satisfaction of justice: 
  The laws of God are likewise concerned with justice, but they are also 
concerned with the mercy made possible because of the atonement. Church 
doctrine explains this. 
  The idea of justice as what one deserves is the fundamental premise of all 
scriptures that speak of men’s being judged according to their works. The Savior 
told the Nephites that all men would stand before him to be “judged of their works, 
whether they be good or whether they be evil.” (3 Ne. 27:14; also see Mosiah 
15:26–27; Alma 41:3–4.) In his letter to the Romans, Paul described “the righteous 
judgment of God” in terms of “render[ing] to every man according to his deeds.” 
(Rom. 2:5–6.) Our second Article of Faith affirms that “men will be punished for 
their own sins, and not for Adam’s transgression.” 
  According to eternal law, when a commandment is broken, a commensurate 
penalty may be imposed. “There is a law given, and a punishment affixed,” the 
prophet Alma taught, and “justice claimeth the creature and executeth the law, and 
the law inflicteth the punishment.” “For behold,” he continued, “justice exerciseth 
all his demands.” (Alma 42:22, 24.) The justice of God “divide[s] the wicked from 
the righteous.” (1 Ne. 15:30.) By itself, justice is uncompromising. This is how 
mortals became subject to temporal and spiritual death. 
Id. at 217–18. 
 46. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 47. The interpretation sketched herein, positing the individuality of primal intelligences, 
was supported by Joseph Smith, Brigham Young, Wilford Woodruff, Lorenzo Snow, Orson 
Pratt, George Q. Cannon, John A. Widtsoe, and Joseph Fielding Smith. See Truman G. 
Madsen, Philosophy, in B.H. ROBERTS, THE TRUTH, THE WAY, THE LIFE 605 (John W. Welch 
ed., BYU Studies 2d ed. 1996). An early article espousing the individuality of primal 
intelligences was published in 1907 by B.H. Roberts with the approval of the First Presidency 
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Joseph Smith revealed that all individual persons (“intelligences”) 
exist eternally—are uncreated, indestructible, and beginningless.48 
While few details are known regarding the nature of existence as 
intelligences and differing views have been expressed, B.H. Roberts 
taught: 
[Intelligences] are uncreated; self-existent entities, necessarily self-
conscious, and otherwise consciousness—they are conscious of the 
“me” and the “not me.” They possess powers of comparison and 
discrimination without which the term “intelligence” would be a 
solecism. They discern between evil and good; between good and 
better; they possess will or freedom—within certain limits at least. 
The power, among other powers, to determine upon a given course 
of conduct as against any other course of conduct. The individual 
intelligence can think his own thoughts, act wisely or foolishly; do 
right or wrong.49
On this view, each of us as intelligences were at some point 
provided spirit bodies, became begotten spirit children of our 
Heavenly Father, and were eventually provided the earthly bodies we 
presently possess. Our present existence is thus comprised of our 
earthly bodies, our spirit bodies, and our primal self, our 
intelligence.50
Because we are, in this sense, essentially uncreated, we are 
ultimately the first cause of all our actions51 and are free to choose 
our course in life. As Truman Madsen has expressed it, “man is, and 
(Joseph F. Smith, President) and seven members of the Council of the Twelve. TRUMAN G. 
MADSEN, ETERNAL MAN 24–25 & n.5 (1966). However, some Church leaders, including 
Bruce R. McConkie, reject the view that individual intelligences existed prior to birth as spirit 
children. See Madsen, Philosophy, supra, at 614 n.32. For a discussion of various theories of the 
pre-existence, see Blake Ostler, The Idea of Pre-Existence in the Development of Mormon 
Thought, DIALOGUE: A JOURNAL OF MORMON THOUGHT, at 59 (1982). 
 48. See STERLING M. MCMURRIN, THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
MORMON RELIGION 49–57 (1965); MADSEN, ETERNAL MAN, supra note 47, at 13, 24; 
ROBERTS, supra note 47, at 246–57. 
 49. ROBERTS, supra note 47, at 255. Truman Madsen has added: “At a minimum, 
Roberts ascribes to primal intelligences these traits: consciousness, self-consciousness, subject-
object discrimination, generalization, and a prior ratiocination. By these labels Roberts means 
powers of deduction, induction, imagination, memory, deliberation, judgment, and volition.” 
Madsen, Philosophy, supra note 47, at 605. 
 50. Roberts described this process as follows: “[T]hrough generation the father imparts of 
his own nature to his offspring; so that intelligences when begotten spirits have added to their 
own native, underived, inherent qualities somewhat the father’s nature also, and are veritably sons 
of God.” B.H. Roberts, Immortality of Man, IMPROVEMENT ERA, Apr. 1907, at 408.
 51. MADSEN, ETERNAL MAN, supra note 47, at 66. 
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always has been, one of the unmoved movers, one of the originating 
causes in the network.”52 By choosing to follow eternal law we may, 
through the Atonement of Jesus Christ, be perfected and sanctified.53
Apart from their eternal consequences, these concepts have 
obvious relevance for mortal life. Because we are genuinely our own 
agents, we are responsible for our actions.54 Our good actions are 
genuinely ours and merit praise; our bad actions are also genuinely 
ours and merit blame. Culpable violations of earthly law therefore 
merit punishment. Thus if “persons” have a right to be punished 
under Herbert Morris’s view, it would appear a fortiori that eternal 
moral agents would enjoy a similar right.55
The doctrinal importance of agency and accountability for one’s 
choices is vividly illustrated by Latter-day Saint teachings concerning 
 52. Id. at 66 n.9. 
 53. Id. at 67 n.11. 
 54. The Doctrine & Covenants supports the idea of individual agency and responsibility: 
Man was also in the beginning with God. Intelligence, or the light of truth, was not 
created or made, neither indeed can be. All truth is independent in that sphere in 
which God has placed it, to act for itself, as all intelligence also; otherwise there is no 
existence. Behold, here is the agency of man, and here is the condemnation of man; 
because that which was from the beginning is plainly manifest unto them, and they 
receive not the light. And every man whose spirit receiveth not the light is under 
condemnation. For man is spirit. The elements are eternal, and spirit and element, 
inseparably connected, receive a fulness of joy; [a]nd when separated, man cannot 
receive a fulness of joy. The elements are the tabernacle of God; yea, man is the 
tabernacle of God, even temples; and whatsoever temple is defiled, God shall 
destroy that temple. The glory of God is intelligence, or, in other words, light and 
truth. Light and truth forsake that evil one. Every spirit of man was innocent in the 
beginning; and God having redeemed man from the fall, men became again, in their 
infant state, innocent before God. And that wicked one cometh and taketh away 
light and truth, through disobedience, from the children of men, and because of the 
tradition of their fathers. 
Doctrine & Covenants 93:29–39. 
Other scriptures also support this view. See, e.g., 2 Nephi 2:16, 2:27 (Book of Mormon) 
(“Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself. . . . Wherefore, men 
are free according to the flesh, and all things are given them which are expedient unto man. 
And they are free to choose liberty and eternal life, through the great Mediator of all men, or 
to choose captivity and death.”); Helaman 14:30 (Book of Mormon) (“[W]hosoever 
perisheth, perisheth unto himself; and whosoever doeth iniquity, doeth it unto himself; for 
behold, ye are free; ye are permitted to act for yourselves; for behold, God hath given unto you 
a knowledge and he had made you free.”); Moses 5:56 (Pearl of Great Price) (“And it is given 
unto [man] to know good from evil; wherefore they are agents unto themselves.”). 
 55. Some philosophers might contend that free will and, hence, moral responsibility are 
meaningful only if persons exist as uncreated and uncaused agents. Truman Madsen notes that 
John Wisdom holds that “freedom is only explicable if we assume man’s pre-mortal existence.” 
MADSEN, ETERNAL MAN, supra note 47, at 66 n.7. 
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the “war in heaven”56 that took place prior to mortal existence. The 
controversy involved God the Father’s unembodied spirit children 
who elected to follow either Lucifer, whose plan was to compel all 
mortality to righteousness and thus eternal life, or God’s Only 
Begotten Son, Jesus Christ, who embraced the Father’s plan. This 
latter plan, which of course prevailed, was that mortal persons would 
be free to choose righteousness, or its opposite, and thus participate 
in their own salvation.57 The Father looked upon Lucifer’s plan with 
abhorrence. Because Lucifer embraced it, he became Satan, and he 
and his followers were cast out of heaven. In the words of Latter-day 
Saint scripture: 
 Wherefore, because that Satan rebelled against me, and sought 
to destroy the agency of man, which I, the Lord God, had given 
him . . . , I caused that he should be cast down; And he became 
Satan, yea, even the devil, the father of all lies, to deceive and to 
blind men, and to lead them captive at his will.58
Thus, these teachings make clear that denying persons their 
agency is a grave evil. Translated to the context of earthly criminal 
law, it would appear that programs that deny human freedom and 
coerce observance of the law would be highly objectionable. For 
Latter-day Saints, Herbert Packer’s “good behavior pill”59 could be 
seen as another manifestation of Satan’s attempt “to destroy the 
agency of man,” in blatant denial of a person’s divine “right to be 
bad” if he or she so chooses.60 Furthermore, Latter-day Saint insights 
into the nature of the war in heaven, and the importance of personal 
 56. Revelation 12:7–9 (King James). For further information on the Church’s belief on 
agency and the premortal life see TEACHINGS OF THE PROPHET JOSEPH SMITH 354–65 
(Joseph Fielding Smith, ed., 1961); JAMES E. TALMAGE, JESUS THE CHRIST, 6–16 (42d ed., 
1976); BRUCE R. MCCONKIE, MORMON DOCTRINE, 589–90 (2d ed. 1966); Gayle Obald 
Brown, Premortal Life, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM, supra note 40, at 1123–25; 
Alma 13:3–5 (Book of Mormon); Doctrine & Covenants 138:56; Abraham 3:21–23, 3:27 
(Pearl of Great Price); Jeremiah 1:5 (King James); and Jude 1:6 (King James). 
 57. See TALMAGE, supra note 56, at 6–10. 
 58. Moses 4:3–4 (Pearl of Great Price); see also Dallin H. Oaks, The Desires of Our 
Hearts, TAMBULI, June 1987, at 22 (“[A]gency and accountability are eternal principles.”). 
 59. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 60. Fascinating questions arise in considering the question whether the good behavior 
pill would be objectionable if an individual person chooses to take the pill, removing all prior 
propensities to evil. Can virtue be obtained without personal struggle? Would taking the good 
behavior pill, with its forfeiture of free agency, be analogous to selling oneself into slavery? 
Would it be selling one’s soul to the devil? For some possible answers to these questions, see 
OAKS, supra note 27, at viii. 
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accountability in the eternal scheme of things, give support to secular 
theories positing that rights of personhood entail rights to make 
choices, rights to have those choices respected, and thus rights to be 
punished when one culpably violates the criminal law.61
Finally, Latter-day Saint doctrine provides interesting insights 
into why, as Michael Moore observes, we feel a “sickness unto 
death” when we engage in serious misdeeds.62 Our immortal 
intelligence is fortified through our filial association with our Father 
in Heaven,63 and through the influence of the Light of Christ64 and 
the whisperings of the Holy Ghost65 which guide us in our mortal 
lives. If Moore can “trust what [his] . . . guilt feelings tell [him],”66 
Latter-day Saints should be even more confident in relying on 
certain messages from spiritual sources, given their understanding of 
the virtuous sources of such messages. Thus, Latter-day Saints may 
feel a special affinity to Moore’s theory and conclude with him that 
guilty offenders must be punished. 
 61. See supra notes 9–17 and accompanying text. 
 62. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 63. See MADSEN, ETERNAL MAN, supra note 47, at 66. Truman Madsen writes, “Long 
before mortality, in a process of actual transmission, there were forged into man’s spirit the 
embryonic traits, attributes, and powers of God Himself!” Id. at 35. We thus possess a “divine 
nature” to supplement our own innate possibilities of prime intelligence. Id. at 37, 66. 
 64. Doctrine & Covenants 88:6–7, 88:13 explains: 
[Jesus Christ] ascended up on high, as also he descended below all things, in that he 
comprehended all things, that he might be in all and through all things, the light of 
truth; Which truth shineth. This is the light of Christ. As also he is in the sun, and 
the light of the sun, and the power thereof by which it was made. . . . The light 
which is in all things, which giveth life to all things, which is the law by which all 
things are governed, even the power of God who sitteth upon his throne, who is in 
the bosom of eternity, who is in the midst of all things. 
B.H Roberts describes the Light of Christ as, among other things, an “intelligence-inspiring 
power” that is “God immanent in the universe.” ROBERTS, supra note 47, at 225–26. 
 65. Bruce R. McConkie has noted that “[the] companionship [of the Holy Ghost] is 
the greatest gift that mortal man can enjoy. His mission is to perform all of the functions 
appertaining to the various name-titles which he bears [Comforter, Testator, Revelator, 
Sanctifier]. . . .[H]e has power . . . to perform essential and unique functions for men.” 
MCCONKIE, supra note 56, at 359. B.H. Roberts adds: “[F]rom whose immediate personal 
presence [the Holy Ghost] there goes forth a special, spiritual, witnessing power—pure spirit 
of intelligence—which brings to those brought into contact with it a witness of the truth, of all 
truth.” ROBERTS, supra note 47, at 226. 
 66. See supra text accompanying notes 22–25. 
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IV. THE DEATH PENALTY 
It remains to consider what place, if any, the death penalty 
occupies in Latter-day Saint thought and doctrine. This is a subject 
worth attention because confusion exists within the Latter-day Saint 
community regarding the place of capital punishment in the context 
of the restored gospel. 
The doctrine of “blood atonement” often comes up in this 
context. Blood atonement is the doctrine that an offender’s shedding 
his own blood is necessary for his possible salvation. In an earlier 
paper, I noted that while nineteenth-century leaders often discussed 
the death penalty in terms of the doctrine of blood atonement, the 
Church presently rejects any defense of capital punishment by appeal 
to this doctrine.67
With regard to the death penalty generally, neither scriptural 
authority nor authoritative declarations from Church leaders give 
theological support to a commitment to capital punishment.68 
Indeed, representatives have recently clarified that the Church adopts 
a neutral position on the death penalty, neither promoting nor 
opposing its imposition.69 Notwithstanding such declarations, 
occasional references to blood atonement continue to surface as a 
Mormon folk doctrine.70 Moreover, a well-known treatise 
 67. See generally Gardner, supra note 32. 
 68. See id. Note, however, that official Church doctrine does mandate following the laws 
of the land whether or not such laws embrace the death penalty. See supra notes 4, 29, 30.
 69. See, e.g., Hannah Wolfson, LDS Church Remains Neutral on Death Penalty, 
STANDARD EXAMINER, May 5, 2001, at 3C; Don Lattin, Musings of the Main Mormon, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, April 13, 1997, at 3/Z1. However, several sources indicate that the 
Church has had varying viewpoints over time. See, e.g., Roy W. Doxey, The Law of Moral 
Conduct, RELIEF SOCIETY MAGAZINE, Aug. 1960; Stuart W. Hinckley, Capital Punishment, 
in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM, supra note 40, at 255; Doctrine & Covenants 42:19, 
42:79; Genesis 9:12 (Joseph Smith Translation); Leviticus 24:17 (King James). 
The Church’s current position on capital punishment has been stated as follows: “The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints regards the question of whether and in what 
circumstances the state should impose capital punishment as a matter to be decided solely by 
the prescribed processes of civil law. We neither promote nor oppose capital punishment.” Posting 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to Newsroom.lds.org, at http://www. 
lds.org/newsroom/mistakes/0,15331,3885-1-16708,00.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2003). 
 70. See, e.g., Peggy Fletcher Stack, Concept of Blood Atonement Survives in Utah Despite 
Repudiation, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Nov. 5, 1994, at D1. For further information on the 
concept of blood atonement see JOSEPH FIELDING SMITH, The Doctrine of Blood Atonement, 
in 1 ANSWERS TO GOSPEL QUESTIONS 180 (1957); MCCONKIE, supra note 56, at 92–93; 
Charles W. Penrose, Blood Atonement as Taught by Leading Elders of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM, supra note 40, at 131; Lowell M. 
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expounding Mormon doctrine, published in 1966, continues to be 
circulated which defends blood-spilling modes of capital punishment 
as necessary for atonement of sins.71 In addition, Doctrine and 
Covenants section 42 verse 19 currently contains a cross reference to 
“Capital Punishment” in the Topical Guide to the standard works of 
the Church,72 despite the fact that Dallin H. Oaks maintains that the 
scripture has nothing to do with the death penalty.73
Leaving such confusing matters aside, I would like to reconsider 
briefly the status of the death penalty in Latter-day Saint thought in 
light of the argument presented in this paper. I have argued that 
Church doctrine provides a foundation for a commitment to a just 
deserts theory of criminal punishment in general but does not 
provide a basis for a commitment to the death penalty in particular. 
Therefore, Latter-day Saint retributivists must necessarily form their 
opinions about employment of capital punishment in light of secular 
retributive arguments, some of which, as I will show in the 
remainder of the article, do not entail a commitment to the death 
penalty but in fact provide a basis for opposing it. While many 
retributivists—certainly Kant—see capital punishment of murderers 
and perhaps other serious offenders as a requirement of justice,74 
others see no necessary connection between just deserts theory and 
the death penalty.75 Thus, Latter-day Saints can logically subscribe to 
a just deserts theory but need not favor the death penalty. For 
example, so far as I know, Herbert Morris has never advocated use of 
the death penalty. Indeed, the subject is not even mentioned in his 
Persons and Punishment paper. In any event, what he and all 
retributivists require is that offenders suffer in proportion to their 
culpability and the seriousness of their offense, whatever form that 
suffering may take. For many modern retributivists, the actual 
punishment imposed for a given crime is not fixed by any defining 
Snow, Blood Atonement, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM, supra note 40, at 131; 3 
MESSAGES OF THE FIRST PRESIDENCY 183–87 (James R. Clark ed., 1966).
 71. MCCONKIE, supra note 56, at 92. McConkie later repudiated this view: “There 
seems to me to be no present significance as to whether an execution is by firing squad or in 
some other way.” Quoted in Gardner, supra note 32, at 18.
 72. Doctrine & Covenants 42:19 n.b. 
 73. See OAKS,  supra note 27, at 162.
 74. See, e.g., WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1979). 
 75. See, e.g., David McCord, Imagining a Retributivist Alternative to Capital 
Punishment, 50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998). 
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principle, such as Kant’s lex talionis, but is relative to time and place. 
As Stephen Morse has explained: 
Few sophisticated persons would claim that there is an invariant, 
objective deserved punishment for each offensive act. But desert 
theorists only need to make a more modest claim: It is possible in 
any society to rank the seriousness of criminal offenses and to 
assign to each a punishment that the society at that time considers 
proportional to the seriousness of the offense. This is then the 
deserved punishment at that time and in that place.76
Moreover, even if we conclude as a theoretical matter that justice 
demands that some offenders deserve to die for their crimes, practical 
implementation of the death penalty raises problems for 
retributivists. Considering just the crime of homicide, retributivists 
agree that not all killers, not even all murderers, deserve death.77 
Capital punishment is reserved for only the most morally culpable, 
described by Richard Lempert as “those who fully intended, and 
perhaps rejoiced in, the suffering and death they inflicted and who, 
in some meaningful sense, could have done otherwise.”78 Moral 
culpability is thus a subjective state requiring for its assessment the 
ability to “search people’s minds.”79 However, perfect assessments of 
culpability are unattainable in earthly tribunals. As a consequence, 
Lempert observes: 
[The inability of the legal system to truly determine the most evil 
offenders and thus those most deserving of death] means that in 
deciding whether to inflict the death penalty we often attend more 
to the circumstances of the crime than to the circumstances of the 
criminal. The person who slays in a peculiar or brutal way is more 
likely to receive the death penalty than one who dispatches his 
victim with a single bullet, yet the former may have been insane 
under all but the narrowest legal test while the latter was cool and 
calculating.80
 76. Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1493–94 
(1984) (book review). 
 77. Richard O. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the 
Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1182 (1981); see also, Peter Arenella, 
Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral 
Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511 (1992). 
 78. Lempert, supra note 77, at 1183. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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Not only does the legal system risk the injustice of executing 
those who, though guilty of a criminal act, are not sufficiently 
culpable to deserve the death penalty, but also perhaps the greater 
injustice of executing totally innocent persons who have committed 
no criminal act.81
 81. While such situations are no doubt rare, the recent use of DNA and other evidence 
has revealed that totally innocent people are sometimes convicted and sentenced to death. 
Justice Breyer of the United States Supreme Court has recently cited a study documenting at 
least 100 known cases of death row inmates who were exonerated through DNA tests in the 
latter decades of the twentieth century. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2447 (2002) 
(Breyer J., concurring) (citing Henry Weinstein, The Nation’s Death Penalty Foes Mark a 
Milestone Crime: Arizona Convict Freed on DNA Tests Is Said to Be the 100th Known 
Condemned U.S. Prisoner to Be Exonerated Since Executions Resumed, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2002, at A16). 
Such statistics led Judge Jed Rakoff to hold that the Federal Death Penalty Act violates 
due process. Judge Rakoff found: 
  The best available evidence indicates that, on the one hand, innocent people 
are sentenced to death with materially greater frequency than was previously 
supposed and that, on the other hand, convincing proof of their innocence often 
does not emerge until long after their convictions. It is therefore fully foreseeable 
that in enforcing the death penalty a meaningful number of innocent people will be 
executed who otherwise would eventually be able to prove their innocence. It 
follows that implementation of the Federal Death Penalty Act not only deprives 
innocent people of a significant opportunity to prove their innocence, and thereby 
violates procedural due process, but also creates an undue risk of executing innocent 
people, and thereby violates substantive due process. 
United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Although Quinones 
was subsequently reversed, United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002), Judge 
Rakoff’s views remain relevant to policymakers. 
A recent commentary notes: 
  A citizen of Illinois who had been measured for his coffin and was within two 
days of execution is proven innocent of the murders for which he had been 
convicted and sentenced to death. Twelve other men, also convicted and sentenced 
to death in Illinois, are similarly exonerated, declared innocent, and set free. The 
belief of the complacent in the efficacy of the criminal justice system is shattered by 
revelations of police torture, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffectiveness of defense 
counsel. This is Illinois in the year 2001, and the whole world is watching. 
  . . . . 
  In some cases, wrongful convictions of defendants under sentence of death 
were established by circumstances other than ineffectiveness of defense counsel or 
prosecutorial misconduct. In fact, au contrare, it was the persistence of defense 
counsel and the cooperation of the state which assisted in the exoneration of the 
defendant. 
  In People v. Jones, the defense counsel never gave up in his efforts to prove 
Ronald Jones’ innocence. The defendant was convicted of murder and aggravated 
sexual assault of a south side woman in 1985. He was sentenced to death. The 
Illinois Supreme Court, despite defendant’s claim of innocence, affirmed the 
convictions and sentence. 
GAR-FIN 9/30/2003 6:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
886 
 
Lempert observes: 
 Retributivism is also haunted by those executions of the 
innocent which inevitably occur if the death penalty is allowed. It is 
true that documented cases in which the wrong person is executed 
are quite rare, and likely to remain so. But, as a purely philosophical 
matter, this is of little help to the retributivist. Retributivism, on its 
own terms, allows life to be taken only when death is deserved; it 
does not tolerate killing as a means to some greater social good. 
Retributivists are proud of their Kantian heritage, which demands 
that life be treated only as an end. Thus, however good a just 
punishment system and however much such a system demands the 
death penalty, the philosophy of retributivism apparently forbids 
the sacrifice of innocent lives as a condition for the maintenance of 
such a system. . . . 
 . . . While the mistaken conviction of those who have not killed 
is certainly rare, the mistaken allocation of responsibility to those 
who have killed may be uncomfortably common. To the 
retributivist one mistake is almost as bad as another, for in most 
retributivist schemes the unpremeditated murderer or the insane 
  The defendant then filed a post-conviction petition, charging that the police 
beat him into a confession, and he requested DNA testing to establish his 
innocence. The trial Judge stated on the record: “What issue could possibly be 
resolved by DNA testing?” Jones was exonerated after DNA testing was done, and 
the Cook County State’s Attorney’s office agreed to vacate his conviction and drop 
all charges against him in the light of that definitive evidence. 
Marshall J. Hartman & Stephen L. Richards, The Illinois Death Penalty: What Went Wrong?, 
34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 409, 428–29 (2001) (citations omitted). 
One wonders how many innocent defendants, who did not have lawyers like those who 
represented Ronald Jones, have gone to their death at the hands of the state. A recent 
casebook notes: 
  Death penalty opponents argue that, even if the death penalty were thought to 
be moral and socially useful, it still should be abolished because it has not been, and 
cannot be, fairly imposed. This argument is supported by the most comprehensive 
study yet done on post-Furman death sentences: J. Liebman, J. Fagen & V. West, A 
Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, (2000). The study of all 
death sentences during the period 1973–95, documented inter alia, that 68% of all 
death sentences were reversed for prejudicial error and that 82% of those whose 
sentences were reversed were not again sentenced to death. Thus, at least 56% of the 
death sentences imposed were “wrong.” 
NINA RIVKIND & STEVEN F. SHATZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEATH PENALTY 14–15 
(2001). While the authors argue that the figure of fifty-six percent “wrong” death penalty 
sentences may in fact be too low, id. at 15 n.27, it should be noted that these figures do not 
necessarily establish that the “wrongly” imposed death sentences involved cases where 
defendants did not commit the criminal acts charged. 
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killer no more deserves to die than the innocent victim of 
misidentification. In arguing from a retributivist philosophy to an 
actual system of state executions, retributivists are again advocating 
a system that will work substantial injustice as measured by the 
standards of the philosophical system they espouse. 
 . . . . 
 In short, there is a fundamental irony to the usual retributivist 
position. Basic principles of moral justice that are believed to justify 
or even demand the death of those who maliciously kill others are 
necessarily offended by the attempt to impose a system of state 
executions in an imperfect world. The emphasis that retributivists 
place on human beings as ends and not as means, the high value 
they place on innocent human life, and their insistence that 
retributivism (unlike revenge) respects the bounds of law combine 
to form a philosophy from which one cannot derive a policy that 
trades the wrongful execution of a few for the proper execution of 
many.82
Such considerations pose problems for retributive defenses of 
capital punishment and suggest that, perhaps ironically for some, a 
Latter-day Saint perspective on punishment, with its adherence to 
principles of just deserts, would not embrace nor merely be 
indifferent to the death penalty, but would actually oppose it. Dallin 
H. Oaks has cautioned us, as individuals, to “refrain from making 
final judgments on people because we lack the knowledge and the 
wisdom to do so.”83 Perhaps such counsel would apply equally to the 
“final judgment” entailed when the legal system employs its ultimate 
and irrevocable sanction. 
Finally, because the death penalty is uniquely ultimate and 
irrevocable,84 it is perhaps appropriate to consider the wisdom of its 
employment in a broader perspective than applied to non-capital 
punishment, arguments for which I have made solely in terms of 
 82. Lempert, supra note 77, at 1182–84. 
 83. Dallin H. Oaks, “Judge Not” and Judging, ENSIGN, Aug. 1999 at 7–8. 
 84. On numerous occasions, the United States Supreme Court has noted that because 
of its finality the death penalty is sui generis. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 21 (1956) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (finality of death 
penalty requires “greater degree of reliability when imposed”); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 
(1980) (because of the irrevocability of the death penalty, the Constitution places special 
constraints on the procedures used to convict an accused of a capital offense and sentence him 
to death; the trial judge must give jury the option to convict of a lesser offense). 
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considerations of justice. Brett Scharffs has argued that in 
administering criminal law God requires us, as he did Micah, “to do 
justly, and to love mercy and to walk humbly.”85 If so, I suggest that 
it is perhaps in the sui generic context of the death penalty that the 
virtues of humility and mercy, in addition to justice, have relevance. 
Given the imperfections of human legal systems, humility should 
attend our contemplations of the death penalty and perhaps caution 
us that we really are unable to make the ultimate assessments of 
personal responsibility required by justice in order to take an 
offender’s life. In so doing, rather than risk the injustice of executing 
the innocent, we might choose to execute no one, thus mercifully 
permitting offenders truly deserving death to live.86
But if these considerations counsel against imposing the death 
penalty, would they not be equally applicable in the context of other 
punishments such as incarceration? While this question deserves 
extensive discussion, I will give only a brief response here. It appears 
true that “rough justice” is the best our legal system can ever 
achieve. But because of its finality and irrevocability, imposition of 
the death penalty may demand a more perfect system of justice than 
we can offer. While doing rough justice may be insufficient in the 
context of the death penalty, it suffices, indeed is mandated, 
 85. Micah 6:8 (King James). See generally, Brett Scharffs, Centering on Humility, CLARK 
MEMORANDUM, Winter 1998, at 2. 
 86. Regarding the problem of not giving the truly culpable their just deserts by 
abolishing the death penalty, Lempert notes: 
Absent the death penalty there would still be substantial retributivism and thus 
justice in the form of sentences to life imprisonment. A number of innocent people 
will necessarily receive such sentences since mistakes are an inevitable part of any 
punishment system. The marginal loss of retributively defined justice in the case of 
the guilty will be the difference between the retributivism inherent in the life 
sentence and that inherent in an execution, but the marginal gain in justice accorded 
the innocent will be greater. A number of the innocent will prove their 
blamelessness after conviction, be released early from prison, and in all probability 
be compensated to some extent for the time they have served. Note that the 
presence of the death penalty may also contribute to the unjustified infliction of less 
than death sentences on the innocent. A guilty plea by an innocent accused may be 
more likely in a death penalty jurisdiction than in a jurisdiction where one does not 
risk death by asserting his innocence, and a jury qualified to impose the death 
penalty may be more likely mistakenly to convict of a less than capital offense than 
one which has not been so qualified. 
Lempert, supra note 77, at 1183 n.16 (citing Craig Haney, Juries and the Death Penalty: 
Readdressing the Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 512 (1980); George L. 
Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a “Death Qualified” Jurie on the Guilt Determination Process, 
84 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1971)). 
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elsewhere. Where discovery of erroneous convictions occur, they may 
be reversed, and those improperly incarcerated or otherwise 
punished may be released and perhaps monetarily compensated for 
their time served.87 Some such injustice can be tolerated in the 
attempt to dispense punishment to truly deserving offenders. The 
theory advanced in this paper obligates us to do justice. That 
requires our constant diligence in striving for a truly just system. In 
the meantime, it is better to do rough justice than to do no justice at 
all. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have examined whether there might be a distinctly 
Latter-day Saint perspective on criminal law, particularly its 
imposition of the punitive sanction. I have suggested that if such a 
perspective exists, it appears grounded in concepts of justice that 
flow from Latter-day Saint insights into the eternal principles of 
agency and personal accountability. If this argument is sound, it 
commits Latter-day Saints to strive for and uphold systems of 
criminal law that do justice. Such a commitment does not, however, 
necessarily obligate Church members to advocate the death penalty; 
indeed, it may even lead them to oppose it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 87. Lempert, supra note 77, at 1183 n.16. 
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